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1 
CONFIDENTIALITY REVISITED: 
BLESSING OR CURSE IN INTERNATIONAL  
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION? 
 
Gu Weixia∗ 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
A. General Remarks 
 
At a time when international arbitration is gaining increasing popularity with 
transnational businesses, there is general agreement that, among the principal 
advantages of arbitration as a method of dispute resolution,1 confidentiality is one 
of the most attractive selling points.  
The importance of confidentiality mainly flows from the fact that arbitration is 
essentially a private process.  A former Secretary-General of the ICC stated, 
 
It became apparent to me very soon after taking up my responsibilities at the ICC 
that the users of international commercial arbitration, i.e. the companies, 
governments and individuals who are parties in such cases, place the highest value 
upon confidentiality as a fundamental characteristic of international commercial 
arbitration.  When inquiring as to the features of international commercial 
arbitration which attracted parties to it as opposed to litigation, confidentiality of 
the proceedings and the fact that these proceedings and the resulting award would 
not enter into the public domain was almost invariably mentioned.2  
 
                                                 
∗ SJD Candidate, The University of Hong Kong. LLB, East China University of Politics & Law; 
MCL, The University of Hong Kong. I am grateful to my SJD supervisors Professors Xianchu Zhang 
and Katherine Lynch at the University of Hong Kong for their comments.  
1 General advantages of international commercial arbitration include: party autonomy, expertise, 
procedural flexibility, confidentiality, world recognition and enforcement.  For a detailed discussion 
of the advantages and attributes of arbitration, see CHRISTIAN BUHRING-UHLE, ARBITRATION AND 
MEDIATION IN INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS 134-41 (1997); see also RICHARD GARNETT & JEFF 
WAINCYMER, A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 11-14 (2000). 
2 Expert Report of Stephen Bond Esq. in Esso/BHP v. Plowman (1995), reprinted in 11 ARB. 
INT’L 273, para. 6 (1995). “Those allegations in commercial disputes may involve bad faith, 
misrepresentation, technical or managerial incompetence, lack of adequate financial resources, or 
whatever the case may be.”  See also ALAN REDFERN & MARTIN HUNTER, LAW AND PRACTICE OF 
INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION PARAS. 1-53 (4th ed. 2004). 
 Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2641317 
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B. The Legal Definition of Confidentiality 
 
1. Privacy v. Confidentiality 
The duty of confidentiality has always been considered as originating naturally 
from the private nature of the arbitration proceeding. This notion is controversial to 
the extent that it fails to distinguish “confidentiality” from “privacy.” 
Unfortunately, however, only passing reference has been made in the 
contemporary texts on arbitration laws and institutional rules as to the legal 
definition of confidentiality and the distinction between the seemingly 
synonymous concept of privacy.3 
As one author has noted, “Privacy is concerned with the right of persons other 
than the arbitrators, parties and their necessary representatives and witnesses, to 
attend the arbitration hearing and to know about the arbitration. Confidentiality by 
contrast, is concerned with … information relating to the content of the 
proceedings, evidence and documents, addresses, transcripts of the hearings or the 
award.”4 Whilst the purpose of a private hearing is to maintain the confidentiality 
of a dispute that has been submitted to arbitration – to that extent, confidentiality 
and privacy are two sides of the same coins.5 It remains true that parties often 
come to arbitration with the expectation and belief, not just that their dispute will 
be determined in private, but also that matters raised within the arbitration 
proceeding will be treated as confidential. 
                                                 
3 As virtually all arbitration rules do, Article 21 of the ICC Rules 1998 solely confirms a party’s 
right to privacy rather than confidentiality.  Other major institutions, in dealing with the issue, 
mainly reach general consensus upon the privacy of the hearing, the arbitrator’s duty not to disclose 
and the confidentiality of the arbitration award. See AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION (“AAA”) 
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION RULES 2001, Art. 34; STOCKHOLM CHAMBER OF COMMERCE (“SCC”) 
ARBITRATION RULES, Arts. 9 and 20(3); CHINA INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC AND TRADE ARBITRATION 
COMMISSION (“CIETAC”) ARBITRATION RULES, Art. 34(6); UNCITRAL ARBITRATION RULES, Arts. 
Arts. 32(5) and 25(4). On the other hand, however, some common law jurisdictions provide specific 
protection to confidentiality alongside the general privacy requirement. See LONDON COURT OF 
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION (“LCIA”) RULES, Art. 30; SINGAPORE INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 
CENTER (“SIAC”) RULES, Art. 34.6; WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ORGANIZATION (“WIPO”) 
RULES 1994, Arts. 73-76, which provide separately for “Confidentiality of the Existence of the 
Arbitration,” “Confidentiality of Disclosure Made During the Arbitration,” “Confidentiality of the 
Award,” and “Maintenance of Confidentiality by the Center and Arbitrator.” 
4 Expert Report of Dr. Julian D.M. Lew in Esso/BHP v. Plowman, 11 ARB. INT’L 283, 285 
(1995).  
5 Sophie Napper, The Privy Council on Confidentiality And The Enforcement of Awards in 
Associated Electric & Gas Insurance Services Limited v. European Reinsurance Company of Zurich, 
6(2) INT’L A.L. R. 43-44 (2003). 
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Simply speaking, privacy refers to excluding strangers6 from taking part in the 
arbitration hearing, while confidentiality refers to the non-disclosure relationship 
among the arbitration participants. On one hand, privacy lies at the core of the 
arbitration proceedings. Third parties may only be admitted to the hearing of an 
arbitration dispute with the express consent of the parties to the proceedings and 
the arbitrator. On the other, even to the extent that an arbitration is private and the 
public are not admitted, it does not necessarily follow that documents produced for 
and as a result of that hearing are confidential, nor are those present at the hearing 
necessarily bound by terms of confidentiality.7  
In any event, the “secrecy” attribute8 of international arbitration, is by no 
means equal to the absolute binding obligation of “confidentiality,” which must be 
subject to necessary exceptions.  
 
2. Legal Privilege v. Confidentiality 
Confidentiality and privilege are inherently different concepts. However, they 
may overlap and even cause confusion.  
Privilege has been defined as the right of a person to withhold from a judicial 
tribunal information which might assist it to ascertain facts relevant to an issue 
upon which it is adjudicating. Put simply, the legal privilege refers to “a legally 
recognized right to withhold certain testimonial or documentary evidence from a 
legal proceeding, including the right to prevent another from disclosing such 
information.” 9  In the legal profession, lawyers owe their clients a duty of 
confidentiality that communications are privileged during the time the client is 
obtaining legal advice. However, this guarantee of professional privilege is not 
absolute and can be overridden in certain circumstances. 10  The duty of 
confidentiality under the legal privilege is actually a “fiduciary obligation that a 
professional owes to his client based on the factual context of their particular 
relationship.”11  
                                                 
6 In Esso Australia Resources v. Plowman, [1994] at 1 VR 1, Mr. Justice Booking defined 
strangers as “persons whose presence is not necessary or expedient for the proper conduct of [the] 
proceedings.” 
7 As expressed by Mason C.J. in Esso/BHP v. Plowman, reprinted in 11 ARB. INT’L 235, 245 
(1995).  
8 Sometimes “secrecy” is used as interchangeably with “privacy” in arbitration terminology. 
9 See Richard M. Mosk & Tom Ginsburg, Evidentiary Priviliges in International Arbitration, 50 
INT’L COMP. L. Q. Vol.50 345 (2001). 
10 In Hong Kong, a court order or the law may prevent professional privilege from being 
effective. For example, the operation of professional privilege is disallowed by Section 13 of the 
Prevention of Bribery Ordinance (Cap.201) where the communication was not made during his 
course of employment or the consultation was made to a friend who was a lawyer but later refused to 
act as such. 
11 Canadian Transit Co. v. Girdhar, 2001 CarswellOnt 2830, 14 C.P.R. (4th) 34. 
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Arbitration differs from litigation in that the applied evidentiary rules are more 
flexible.12 The duty of confidentiality in arbitration, on the other hand, either arises 
as a natural occurrence collateral to the arbitral procedure per se, or as a matter of 
contractual arrangement devised by the parties in the arbitration agreement. Such 
confidentiality has nothing to do with the particular relationship-based fiduciary 
obligation. In a recent Canadian case,13 the tribunal protected certain confidential 
business documents from disclosure by considering the facts of the case, i.e., 
whether the confidentiality agreement specifically covered the documents, as well 
as the nature of the information contained in the documents.14 
 
C. Split Schools in the International Arbitration Community 
 
Traditionally, in civil-law jurisdictions such as France, Germany and 
Switzerland, where arbitration is considered an efficient method of private dispute 
resolution, it has been taken for granted that great importance be attached to 
confidentiality as a fundamental feature of international commercial arbitration.15 
Arbitrators, the parties and their advisers have traditionally respected not only the 
privacy of the hearings but also the confidentiality of the proceedings and 
documents.16 In Aitah v. Ojjeh, the Paris Court of Appeal held that, “it is in the 
very nature of arbitration proceedings to ensure that the highest level of secrecy 
governs the resolution of private disputes in accordance with the parties’ 
agreement.”17 
Similarly, common-law jurisdictions have also affirmed the principle of 
confidentiality in international commercial arbitration. In England, confidentiality 
may be based upon the parties’ agreement, even where such agreement is only 
implicit. Furthermore, the duty of confidentiality could be implicit in an agreement 
                                                 
12 For example, see Section 2GA of the Hong Kong Arbitration Ordinance (Cap.341): When 
conducting arbitration proceedings, an arbitral tribunal is not bound by the rules of evidence and can 
receive any evidence that it considers relevant to the proceedings, but must give such weight to the 
evidence adduced in the proceedings as it considers appropriate. 
13 Pope & Talbot Ltd. v. I.W.A.-Canada, 2002 CarswellBC 3325, 106 L.A.C. (4th) 19. 
14 Noral Gallagher, Legal Privilege in International Arbitration, (2003) INT’L ARB. L. REV. at 
45-46. 
15 Mr. Bond, who was for many years Secretary-General at the ICC in Paris, gave illustrations of 
this continuing concern and cited inter alia, standard French and Swiss textbooks on Arbitration.  
See supra note 2. 
16 Under French arbitration law, the principle of confidentiality of the arbitrators’ deliberations 
is enshrined in Article 1469 of the New Code of Civil Procedure (Nouveau Code de Procedure Civile 
or NCPC), and has the value of order public. 
17 See Georges Flecheux, Note on the Case Aitah v. Ojjeh, 1986 REV.ARB. 583. 
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to arbitrate even in the absence of a provision such as Article 21(3) of the 
International Chamber of Commerce (“ICC”) Arbitration Rules.18 
In English orthodoxy, there has been little controversy where a general 
consensus has been reached that confidentiality is implied from the inherent private 
nature of the arbitration. This leading position had long maintained its authority 
through a line of case laws, including Dolling-Baker v. Merrett, 19  Hassneh 
Insurance Co. v. Mew20 and Ali Shipping v. “Trogir,”21 until it was recently 
challenged by the Australian High Court decision in Esso Australia Resources v. 
Plowman,22 which held that whilst arbitration was a private arrangement, it was 
not necessarily confidential.  
The denial by Australian courts of a general implied obligation of 
confidentiality as found in the Esso Australia case has been embraced 
independently by court decision of two other jurisdictions, namely Panhandle 
Eastern Corp.23 in the U.S. and Bulgarian Bank24 in Sweden.  
The Australian approach has placed in doubt the widely held assumption that 
confidentiality constitutes an essential feature of an arbitration, where a chain of 
reactions in academic analysis has been brought about.25 According to Paulsson’s 
observations, these cases manifest a split between the “old world” and the “new 
world” as to whether a general rule of confidentiality must be inferred from the 
nature of the arbitral process or whether confidentiality is an exception to be 
narrowly circumscribed by specific agreement between parties or special 
institutional rules for unusual kinds of disputes.26 
Indeed, it is rather surprising that, while confidentiality is so generally assumed 
to be identified with arbitration, the extent to which it applies in particular 
situations is so uncertain, where we find a variety of views ranging from the top 
that confidentiality covers all aspects of arbitration to the bottom that it covers 
none. As the case often goes, the proper view appears to be somewhere in between. 
                                                 
18 ICC INT’L ARBITRATION RULES, Art. 21(3): Save with the approval of the arbitral tribunal and 
the parties, persons not involved in the proceedings shall not be admitted. Available at 
http://www.iccwbo.org/court/english/ arbitration/ rules.asp#articles_21. 
19 Dolling-Baker v. Merrett, [1991] 2 All ER 890. 
20 Hassneh Insurance Co. of Israel v. Stuart J. Mew, [1993] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 243. 
21 Ali Shipping Corporation v. Shipyard “Trogir,” [1998] 2 All E.R. 136. 
22 Esso Australia Resources Ltd. v. Plowman, High Court of Australia, April 7, 1995, (1995) 
128 A.L.R. 391, (1994-1995) 183 CLR 10, summarized in XXI Y.B. COM. ARB. 137 (1996). 
23 United States v. Panhandle Eastern Corporation (D.Del. 1988) 118 F.R.D. 346 
24 Bulgarian Foreign Trade Bank Ltd v. A.I. Trade Finance Inc., (Swedish Supreme Ct. 2000), 
reproduced in 15(11) INT’L ARB. REP. at B-1 (2000). 
25 See Expert Reports and Case Notes of authors regarding the Esso case in 11 ARB. INT’L 
(1995). 
26 CRAIG, PARK & PAULSSON, INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE ARBITRATION 317 (3rd 
ed. 2000). 
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II.  CONCEPTUAL BASIS FOR CONFIDENTIALITY 
 
A.  Threshold Logic for the Duty of Confidentiality 
 
There is no general binding rule that arbitration proceedings are private and 
confidential that precludes parties from divulging details to third parties. The 
threshold logic of establishing the duty of confidentiality can be traced by a 
hierarchy of sources: 
 
a. The parties’ confidentiality agreement, or arbitration agreement expressly 
providing for confidentiality; 
b. The applicable law or the institutional arbitration rules clearly provide for 
a duty of confidentiality. 
 
The extent to which arbitration proceedings, their content, the nature of the 
dispute and all aspects of the arbitration remain confidential is, in the first place, a 
matter for agreement by the parties. The fundamental basis of any arbitration is the 
agreement of the parties to submit their dispute to arbitration. Party autonomy has 
always been and remains the essential ingredient in the framework of arbitration.27 
Parties can expressly provide in an arbitration agreement that absolute or specific 
levels of confidentiality shall apply to their arbitration.  
Where parties are silent as to the conduct of certain aspects of the arbitration, 
e.g., confidentiality, then it is the lex arbitri,28 the law that governs the arbitration, 
that will regulate these particular issues. Surprisingly, until recently, neither the 
national arbitration laws nor the institutional rules imposed a general requirement 
of confidentiality. There have been only general assumptions that the hearings in 
the arbitration are not open to the public. 29  
                                                 
27 The subject matter of the arbitration, the arbitrators’ power and authority, the arbitration rules 
to be applied, how the arbitration is to be conducted, and the underlying law, are determined in the 
first place by the parties.  
28 In practice, the lex arbitri refers to a body of rules which sets a standard external to the 
arbitration agreement, and the wishes of the parties, for the conduct of the arbitration. The lex arbitri 
is likely extended to such matters as: the conduct of the arbitration, including (possibly) rules 
concerning the disclosure of documents, the evidence of witnesses and so on. For detailed analysis, 
see Redfern & Hunter, supra note 2, at 78-81. 
29 This is also the case in both the UNCITRAL Model Law and UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, 
where it is only generally acknowledged that international arbitration is to some extent confidential, 
and thus the precise reach of the concept of confidentiality is an unfilled gap. For general discussions, 
see Expert Report of Dr. Julian D.M.Lew, supra note 4; see also Cindy G. Buys, The Tensions 
Between Confidentiality and Transparency in International Arbitration, 14 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 121 
(2003).  
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The question then arises whether, absent the parties’ express confidentiality 
agreement or clause, and absent express provisions in either arbitration laws or 
institutional rules, the confidentiality obligation can be implied in law, by fact, by 
custom or otherwise.  
 
B.  When Implication Comes into Play 
 
We know from Lord Diplock, that an arbitration clause may import primary or 
secondary obligations and it may have implied conditions as to the procedure 
attached to it.30 In appropriate cases, the law will imply terms into the major 
contracts of everyday occurrence, such as those concerning the sale of goods, 
employer-employee and landlord-tenant. The arbitration agreement is such a 
common contract that it must surely qualify to join this group. With a vacuum in 
the laws and rules governing confidentiality, it is up to the tribunal to decide 
whether the law should imply into the agreement to arbitrate a widely drawn 
obligation of confidentiality. 
In civil-law regimes, the agreement to arbitrate by the parties carries with it an 
implicit agreement of confidentiality. This principle was clearly recognized in 
France in Aiter v. Ojjeh.31 Another leading civil jurisdiction, Sweden, on the other 
hand, took a completely different approach. In a recent case, the Svea Court of 
Appeal adopted the view that “the parties who had agreed to arbitrate assume a 
duty of good faith not to make public information concerning the arbitration.”32 
Implications are also read into the law by common-law arbitrators. In Ali 
Shipping, the English Court of Appeal held that the duty of confidentiality between 
parties to an arbitration did not come from the parties’ intention but arose as a 
matter of law in every arbitration – the law should imply into the agreement to 
arbitrate a widely drawn obligation of confidence.33 Again, the Chief Justice 
                                                 
30 Bremer Vulkan Schiffbau und Maschinenfabrik v. South India Shipping Corporation Ltd., 
[1981] AC 909, 982, per Lord Diplock. 
31 Cour d’appel, Paris, Feb. 18 1986, 1986 REV. ARB. 583. See CRAIG, PARK & PAULSSON, 
INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE ARBITRATION, supra note 26 at 316 (The Paris Court of 
Appeal “imposed substantial civil damages on the appellant for having ‘caused a public debate of 
facts which should remain confidential,’ thus infringing ‘the very nature of arbitral proceedings that 
they ensure the highest degree of discretion on the resolution of private disputes, as the two parties 
had agreed.’”). 
32 A.I. Trade Finance Inc. v. Bulgarian Foreign Trade Bank (Svea App. 1999), reprinted in 14(4) 
INT’L ARB. REP. at A-I (1999). The courts, in dealing with the question of whether publication of the 
interim award constituted a fundamental breach of the duty of confidentiality in arbitration, stated that 
account should be taken of “whether there was an acceptable reason for the publishing, to what extent 
the other party has been caused damage by this and, should it occur, whether the information was 
given with the purpose of harming the opposing party.” 
33 Ali Shipping Corporation v Shipyard Trogi, supra note 21 at 136. 
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Mason in Esso/BHP conveyed his Australian perspective that there should be an 
implied undertaking not to disclose documents made available in an arbitration 
through discovery, just as would be the case in court proceedings.34 
Accordingly, there may be a general practice allowing the arbitrators to 
determine the issue of confidentiality with regard to all the circumstances 
surrounding the case. In exercising this discretion, it is suggested, somewhat along 
the line of the English tradition, that confidentiality be regarded as part of the 
arbitration: “through custom and usage, confidentiality has become an implied 
term of the arbitration agreement.”35 In the meantime, however, quoting Mason 
C.J.’s words in Esso/BHP, “[a]nd the obligation is necessarily subject to the 
public’s legitimate interest in obtaining information about the affairs of public 
authorities.”36 To the extent confidentiality rests on a contractual basis, it must 
give way to demands for disclosure based on law, for a private contractual 
arrangement cannot shield information from disclosure required by law. Last but 
importantly, cautious attention shall be paid that when implications come into play, 
they must be subject to some qualified exceptions.  
 
III. SCOPE AND EXTENT OF CONFIDENTIALITY 
 
The crucial problem here lies in the question, in what circumstances must this 
general assumption of confidentiality give way? 
 
A. Two Outstanding Issues 
 
Jan Paulsson starts his analysis with a classification based upon the timing of 
the procedure, i.e., “Confidentiality before, during and after the arbitration 
proceedings” respectively.37 Whilst in this regard, it seems preferable to share the 
view of Professor Hans Smit who frames the question around two outstanding 
issues: first, who is subject to the duty of confidentiality, i.e., “on whom the 
                                                 
34 Esso Australia Resources Ltd. v. Plowman, supra note 22, per Mason C.J. at 32. 
35  Hans Smit, Breach of Confidentiality as a Ground for Avoidance of the Arbitration 
Agreement, 11 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 574 (2000). For a detailed analysis of the implied approach, see a 
chain of English cases, Dollin –Baker v. Merrett, [1990] 1 WLR 1205 (Eng. CA); Hassneh Insurance 
Co. v. Mew, [1993] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 243 (QB);  Hyundai Engineering v. Active Building (unreported); 
and London & Leeds Estates Ltd. v. Paribas Ltd. (No.2) [1995] EG 134, discussed in Patrick Neill, 
Confidentiality in Arbitration, 12 ARB. INT’L 287, 291-96 (1996). This approach has also been 
adopted by France in Aiter v. Ojjeh, supra note 31, that an “agreement to arbitrate carries with it an 
implicit agreement by the parties to confidentiality.” 
36 Supra note 22, at 33. 
37 Jan Paulsson and Nigel Rawding, The Trouble with Confidentiality,1994 ICC INTERNATIONAL 
COURT OF ARBITRATION BULLETIN 48, and 11 ARB. INT’L 303 (1995). 
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obligation may rest”; and second, the scope of the duty of confidentiality, in that “if 
there is such a duty to what extent arbitration is confidential.”38 
 
1. Who is Subject to the Duty of Confidentiality? 
There are three main groups of participants in the arbitral process to whom the 
duty of confidentiality may apply: arbitrators; third parties, including legal 
representatives and witnesses, no matter whether lay or expert; and the parties 
themselves. The confidentiality of the arbitration is both an obligation imposed 
upon the arbitrators as well as a condition they can impose upon the parties and 
other procedural participants. 
With respect to arbitrators, it has generally been recognized that they have an 
ethical duty to maintain confidentiality. 39  The arbitrator must preserve the 
confidential and private nature of the proceedings. He or she is not allowed to 
communicate any details or names without the parties’ consent.40 
On the other hand, it is also generally accepted that third parties are not bound 
by any duty of confidentiality, absent specific contractual arrangements.41 Thus, 
“while parties may remain bound by their obligations under the… [confidentiality] 
agreement, their legal representative may discontinue in that function, and so 
become a stranger to that agreement.”42 Witnesses of course, are also a potential 
source of limitless leaks. A witness in an arbitration normally appears voluntarily 
and is not subject to any obligation in the agreement to arbitrate; however, it would 
“seem unrealistic and even dangerous to attempt to impose a duty [of 
confidentiality] on witnesses.”43 
                                                 
38 Hans Smit, Case-note on Essp/BHP v. Plowman, 11 ARB. INT’L 299, 300 (1995). 
39 See, e.g., Art. 9 of the International Bar Association’s Ethics for Arbitrators; Canon VI.B of 
the AAA/ABA Code of Ethics for Arbitrators in Commercial Disputes. Likewise, Rule 6 of the 
INTERNATIONAL CENTRE FOR THE SETTLEMENT OF INVESTMENT DISPUTES (ICSID) RULES OF 
PROCEDURE FOR ARBITRATION PROCEEDINGS requires an arbitrator “to sign a declaration promising to 
keep confidential all information coming to the arbitrator’s knowledge as result of his or her 
participation in the proceeding, as well as the contents of the award.” Generally speaking, the 
arbitrators will have the least reason for not preserving confidentiality, but may still be driven by 
concerns for the public weal or professional obligations to make disclosure. The point is that the 
nature and scope of this ethical duty may vary with the situation presented and it is therefore difficult 
to make generalizations. See Smit, supra note 38.  
40 For a list of the different duties of arbitrators, see Final Report on the Status of the Arbitrator, 
7(1) ICC BULLETIN 27, 30 (ICC ed. 1996). 
41 See Alexis C. Brown, Presumption Meets Reality: An Exploration of the Confidentiality 
Obligation in International Commercial Arbitration, 16 AM. U. L. REV. 969, 973 (2001). 
42 Paulsson & Rawding, The Trouble with Confidentiality, supra note 37, at 318. 
43 Some commentators therefore suggest that, “Perhaps, at the most, a duty could be placed on 
parties to the effect that they should seek to obtain from witnesses they wish to call an undertaking 
that they will not disclose what they learn about the case outside the arbitration.”  Id. 319. 
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The more complicated situation involves the parties themselves. Absent an 
express confidentiality agreement or arbitration agreement expressly providing for 
confidentiality between the parties, the duty of parties to maintain the 
confidentiality of the existence and the details of the proceeding “may vary 
significantly depending upon the tribunal and the applicable law and procedures, as 
well as the type of information at issue and the way in which the information may 
be used.”44 Generally, parties may have to disclose what has occurred or is likely 
to occur in an arbitration in order to preserve the public interest or to safeguard 
their own personal interests.45 
Among those arbitration participants, the arbitrator’s duty of confidentiality 
seems the least controversial and uncertain, and is always clearly spelled out in 
arbitration rules and codes of ethics, given the fact that arbitrators are service 
providers with no personal interest in the case. More often than not, these rules 
may only address one side of the table, (i.e. arbitrator), without a similar duty of 
confidentiality imposed on the parties or other participants to the arbitration 
proceeding.  Even where a duty of confidentiality is obviously imposed on the 
arbitrator, several institutions place no restrictions on the parties.46 Therefore, the 
focus of the rest of this discussion will be mainly on the circumstances where 
parties need to maintain their duty of confidentiality. 
 
2. Scope of the Duty of Confidentiality 
After analyzing “on whom this duty of confidentiality must rest,” it is 
thereafter necessary to consider what exactly it is that they may want to keep 
confidential. This may include: (1) the existence of the dispute or the arbitration 
proceeding; (2) the substance of the arbitration proceeding, i.e. the information 
                                                 
44 Buys, supra note 29, at 124. 
45 There are many arbitrations which necessitate reference to other parties or keeping them 
advised or informed of the developments, for instance, to keep the insurer fully informed when a 
claim is backed by insurers (particularly in international shipping disputes); a parent company for the 
purposes of recording contingent liabilities in its accounts; a supervisory authority as in the case of a 
responsible ministry in respect of a public utility (see Esso/BHP, supra note 22); or several parties 
with similar disputes but only one arbitration ongoing.  
46 These include the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) and the American Arbitration 
Association (AAA) under both their domestic and international arbitration rules.  
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exchanged and evidence produced or discovered during the process;47 and (3) all 
or part of the award.48  
In international practice, it might be argued that arbitrations cannot be 
completely confidential because there are often instances in which a private party 
in arbitration needs to reveal information regarding the proceeding, or even may be 
legally obligated to reveal such information.49 For instance, the party may well 
have the duty to disclose the fact of the arbitral proceedings, the names of the 
participants, the nature of the dispute and the possible financial consequences 
thereof to auditors, creditors, insurance companies and shareholders.50 
With respect to the scope of confidentiality, institutional rules only authorize 
non-publication of the award, 51  or publication of the “sanitized” award. 52 
Generally, drafters are reluctant to specify to which extent this obligation of 
confidentiality may extend, or alternatively, the contents that might be subject to 
disclosure. The only exceptional circumstance may be found in the Arbitration 
Rules of the World Intellectual Property Organization (“WIPO”), which include 
the most detailed provisions regarding the parties’ duty of confidentiality of the 
respective type of the information.53 
Regarding the existence of the arbitration proceeding, it seems unrealistic and 
undesirable to establish an absolute prohibition against unilateral publication of the 
                                                 
47 Concerning the hearings and evidence, attention must be given to whether confidentiality 
means prohibiting the arbitration participants from discussing the hearings and the evidence, and/or 
prohibiting the parties from using any information or documents obtained in the proceedings in later 
proceedings with the same or different parties. A similar factual background may be found in 
Associated Electric & Gas Insurance Services Limited v. European Reinsurance Company of Zurich, 
[2003] 1 W.L.R. 1041 (UK PC). 
48 Concerning the award, one must determine whether confidentiality should extend to the result, 
the reasoning (if given) or both, or simply to any identifying information about the parties. There are 
cases when one of the parties wanted to rely on the award of the first arbitration as prima facie 
evidence in the successive proceedings, and both the reasoning and the result were invoked. See Ali 
Shipping Corporation v. Shipyard “Trogir,” supra note 20. 
49 For details, see discussions below at Sec. III(B) infra. 
50 CRAIG, PARK & PAULSSON, supra note 26, at 312. 
51 See, e.g., UNCITRAL ARBITRATION RULES Art. 32(5): “The award may be made public only 
with the consent of both parties”; see also revised INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION RULES OF AAA Art. 
27.4 (July 2003): “An award will not be disclosed unless the parties consent or disclosure of the 
award is required by law.” 
52 “Sanitized” awards refer to awards that have been redacted to ensure that the identity of the 
parties remains confidential. For example, ICC ARBITRATION RULES Art. 28(2) provides: “Additional 
copies [of the award] certified true by the Secretary General shall be made available on request and at 
any time to the parties, but to no one else.”  
53 This is partly because of the particular nature of the disputes it deals with, i.e. intellectual 
property, trade secrets, commercial confidence; the 1994 WIPO ARBITRATION RULES provide in Arts. 
73-76 for confidentiality of “the Existence of the Arbitration,” “Disclosure Made during the 
Arbitration” and “Award.” 
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mere existence of the arbitration. A legitimate need to divulge such information 
shall be qualified and suggestions of a general principle of non-disclosure subject 
to limited exceptions have been proposed.54 
As for the information exchanged and evidence produced or discovered during 
the process, there remains a strong body of opinion that confidentiality of material 
substance disclosed in arbitration proceedings is a desirable element of arbitration 
and that it should be maintained to the maximum extent possible.55 What could be 
taken as a recommending reference is the stipulation by the 1998 Arbitration Rules 
of the London Court of International Arbitration (“LCIA”), where documentary or 
other evidence given by a party or a witness in the arbitration shall be kept 
confidential and shall not be disclosed for purposes other than the arbitration 
without the consent of all parties or order of a court [or arbitral tribunal] having 
jurisdiction.56  
Concerning confidentiality of arbitral awards, as discussed above, a general 
consensus has been reached that unilateral publication or disclosure of the award 
without the express consent of both parties is prohibited57 , and in fact, the 
UNCITRAL Model Law Working Group refrained from inserting a provision on 
publication of awards,58 notwithstanding the fact that awards may fall into the 
                                                 
54  Jan Paulsson and Nigel Rawding suggested the following stipulations concerning 
confidentiality (in institutional rules or contractual clauses), “No information concerning an 
arbitration, beyond names of the parties and the relief requested, may be unilaterally disclosed to a 
third party by any participating party unless it is required to do so by law or by a competent regulatory 
body, and then only: 
• by disclosing no more than what is legally required, and  
• furnishing to the arbitrator details of the disclosure and an explanation of the reason for it.” 
See Paulsson & Rawding, The Trouble with Confidentiality, supra note 37, at 315. 
55 REDFERN & HUNTER, supra note 2 at 30. 
56 See LCIA ARBITRATION RULES Art. 30.1, “Unless the parties expressly agree in writing to the 
contrary, the parties undertake as a general principle to keep confidential … all materials in the 
proceedings created for the purpose of the arbitration and all other documents produced by another 
party in the proceedings not otherwise in the public domain – save and to the extent that disclosure 
may be required of a party by legal duty, to protect or pursue a legal right, or to enforce or challenge 
an award in bona fide legal proceedings before a state court or other judicial authority” (emphasis 
added).  Paulsson and Rawding further suggest, “An arbitrator, when issuing an order for the 
production of documentary or other evidence, may in his discretion make such order conditional upon 
the other party or parties’ specific written undertaking not to disclose any of the evidence (or details 
of it) to third parties” (emphasis added).  Paulsson & Rawding, supra note 37, at 316.  
57 This general understanding of confidentiality of the arbitral award is deemed as one of the 
most attractive components of international commercial arbitration. Since international businessmen 
do not want any adverse inference to be drawn from the arbitral result by the commercial community, 
this is also one of its selling points when arbitration is promoted as a more advantageous dispute 
resolution mechanism compared with litigation.  
58 Indeed it was observed, “It may be doubted whether the Model Law should deal with the 
question whether an award may be published. Although it is controversial since there are good 
reasons for and against such publication, the decision may be left to the parties or the arbitration rules 
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public domain as a result of challenge or enforcement actions,59 or invoked as a 
protective weapon against a third party,60 or presumed to be published in the 
international maritime arbitration societies. 61   We have no quarrel with the 
institutional publication of illustrative awards, sanitized to protect the parties’ 
anonymity.62 
In sum, the confidentially of the arbitration hearings will be protected in 
international arbitration practice. In most cases, this protection has been further 
extended to the evidence produced in connection with those hearings. However, 
with the exception of WIPO, none of the major arbitration institutions expressly 
bar the parties from divulging the existence of the arbitration,63 as well as give 
clear specifications as to the confidentiality of material substance disclosed in 
arbitration proceedings.  For arbitral awards, major institutional rules provide for 
confidentiality of the award, subject to disclosure with the consent of both parties’, 
                                                                                                                           
chosen by them.”  See UNCITRAL Secretariat’s Note A/CN9/207.  See also HOWARD M. 
HOLTZMANN & JOSEPH E. NEUHAUS, A GUIDE TO THE UNCITRAL MODEL LAW ON INTERNATIONAL 
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION: LEGISLATIVE HISTORY AND COMMENTARY 845, para. 101 (1989). 
59 This may also involve the situations where the arbitration proceeding needs to undergo 
supervisory review by the court both for recognition and enforcement. The most interesting position 
in this respect is the updated provisions contained in the Hong Kong Arbitration Ordinance (Cap. 341, 
effective on June 30, 1997), which provides in Section 2D that “Proceedings under this Ordinance in 
the Court or Court of Appeal shall on the application of any party to the proceedings be heard 
otherwise than in open court,” which means publication of the proceedings may be withheld if a party 
so requests and may be subject to the sanction of contempt (Updated Section 5 of the 1989 Hong 
Kong Arbitration Ordinance).  
60 See, e.g., the Hassneh Insurance Co. case, supra note 20; and the Ali Shipping case, supra 
note 21. In both cases, the winning party wanted to invoke the successful award of the first arbitration 
as prima facie evidence in the subsequent arbitration proceeding against the opposing party. 
61 Many of the maritime arbitration rules reverse the usual presumption that international 
arbitration awards shall remain confidential. Instead, many provide that awards are published as a 
matter of course unless both parties request in advance that such award not be published. See, e.g., the 
Society of Maritime Arbitrators (SMA) webpage on publications, available at 
http://www.smany.org/sma/sma-pubs.html; see also Japan Shipping Exchange (JSE) Rules of 
Maritime Arbitration, Sec. 36, available at http://www.gsid.nagoyau.ac.jp/project/apec/lawdb/ 
japan/dispute/jseord-en.html. 
62 For example, extracts published in the ICCA Yearbook or ICC Bulletin, where awards are 
referred to only by their docket numbers without naming the parties involved. By the same token, the 
“sanitized” ICC awards, by removing the names of the parties and geographical and industrial facts 
which would risk identifying the case and its participants, are encouraged for educational purposes. 
We have not perceived any breach of confidentiality. For a detailed analysis for the positive effects of 
publishing the “sanitized” arbitral awards, see Paulsson & Rawding: The Trouble with Confidentiality, 
supra note 37, at 312-13. 
63 An example is found in Amco Asia Corp. et al v. Republic of Indonesia, where the ICSID 
tribunal agreed that the ICSID Rules of Arbitration “do not prohibit individual parties from discussing 
the case and the status of the arbitration, publicly or otherwise.” Procedural Decision of 9 December 
1983, 24 ILM 365 (1985). The decision is summarized in Paulsson & Rawding: The Trouble with 
Confidentiality, supra note 37, at 307-08. 
14 THE AMERICAN REVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION [Vol. 15 
  
as required by law, for purpose of recognition and enforcement procedures, or in 
the form of a “sanitized” report for research purposes.64 
 
B. Criteria for Justified Disclosure  
 
The crucial problem that here follows here is determining under what 
circumstances must this general assumption of confidentiality be overridden. Apart 
from the parties’ consent as an unequivocal qualification to disclosure, this article 
tries to propose certain criteria for other conditions, which is based upon a 
“balance of interests” as a policy consideration to justify the so-called 
“compulsory disclosure.”  
 
1. The “Balance of Interests” Approach  
There are two main categories of interests contemplated, namely, “public 
interests” and “private interests.. The former justifies disclosure (1) under 
compulsion by law, which can be further elaborated as either pursuant to court 
order requiring disclosure of prior arbitration documents for the purposes of a 
subsequent court action, or legal obligations by regulatory bodies65; (2) by leave of 
the court for review and enforcement procedures; or (3) by arbitral parties when a 
government or governmental organ is involved.66 “Private interests” refers to those 
situations when disclosure is necessary to protect the legitimate interests of an 
arbitration party. 
 
2. Public Interests 
While ground (2) above, “disclosure by leave of the court” 67 in the first 
category (“public interests”) seems quite clear, circumstances falling into grounds 
(1) and (3) are less so.  In this regard, experiences may be borrowed from a pair of 
Australian cases, namely Esso/BHP68 and Commonwealth v. Cockatoo,69 from 
which a literature of “public interests” has rapidly flourished. 
                                                 
64  LEW ET AL., COMPARATIVE INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION at para. 24-99, 
24-104 (2003).  
65 Obligations to auditors, banks, other creditors, insurers, shareholders and etc.; by the same 
token, the right of a sub-contractor to know the terms and circumstances of an arbitral dispute 
between the main contractor and the owner of the works. What is strikingly surprising is the 
comments by Brennan J. in Esso/BHP, where he put the language, “… information should be kept 
confidential and not be disclosed except (a) under compulsion by law; (b) where there is a duty, albeit 
not a legal duty, to the public to disclose; …”, where moral duties seem to qualify the justification. 
66 See, e.g., the Esso/BHP case, supra note 22. 
67 The award or even the procedural details will become public if court decisions are initiated 
concerning its validity or enforcement. 
68 Esso/BHP case, supra note 22. 
69 Commonwealth of Australia v. Cockatoo Dockyard Pty Ltd., (1995) 36 NSWLR 662. 
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The Australian court in Esso/BHP explained the “public” by holding that that 
there should be an implied duty of confidentiality and non-disclosure except in the 
following:  
 
Firstly, where a party in possession of a document or information is under a 
common law or statutory duty to disclose this material to a third party; secondly, 
where there is a duty, albeit not a legal one, to disclose the document or 
information to the public.70 
 
It goes without saying that there are circumstances in which the public might 
have a legitimate interest in knowing what has transpired in an arbitration, and in 
such a case, there exists a “public interest” exception to the duty of confidentiality. 
Some hints may be traced from the comments by the trial judge, Marks J. in 
Esso/BHP, where a “public interest factor” had been referred to: 
 
The outcome of the dispute will affect all Victorians who use gas and/or electricity. 
The financial condition of the State and the people who live in it already is the 
cause of much anxiety. It is essential that it is known as soon as possible whether 
the price of natural gas is to rise.71 
 
Alternatively, there must exist a strong desire to ensure public access to 
information of legitimate concern to justify a real public interest in making that 
disclosure. 72 How disputes are actually decided concerns not only the parties to 
the arbitration, but may also have substantial effects on the world at large, 
including shareholders, administrative regulators, consumers, and the like. 73 
Decisions affecting them should be subject to public scrutiny. The “public 
interests” exception was applied in Cockatoo Dockyard by Kirby P, with its 
objective to prevent a party from quarantining information that ought legitimately 
to have been released to the public simply because it was disclosed during the 
course of an arbitration.  
In these circumstances, the rule of law requires that, protective of other 
competing public interest, the tribunal will define and, where necessary and 
appropriate, declare the limits beyond which the purported powers in pursuit of 
                                                 
70 Esso/BHP case, supra note 22, per Mason C.J. at 32. 
71 Id., quoting from the transcript p.10.  
72 Id., per Mason JC, at 31. 
73 On the res judicata effects of arbitral awards and societal interest in disclosure of arbitral 
awards in this context, see Section IV(A), infra as an example.  
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private arbitration intrude into competition with other legitimate public rights and 
duties.74 
A more thorny issue arises when governments are involved in the arbitration 
proceedings. “Where one of those parties is a government, or an organ of 
government, neither the arbitral agreement nor the general procedural powers of 
the arbitrator will extend so far as to stamp on the government litigant a regime of 
confidentiality or secrecy which effectively destroys or limits the general 
governmental duty to pursue the public interest.”75 Then “the public interest in the 
dissemination of information is given priority over all other competing interests, 
such as the natural desire of a commercial entity … to restrict to the privacy of the 
arbitration room material such as price sensitive data and untested allegations made 
by government witnesses.”76  
One further concern embarrassing the arbitration community might be that a 
public interest exception could even arise when there existed merely a moral, as 
opposed to legal, duty to account to the public for the manner in which a public 
entity performed its functions.77 In the Australian context, these recent decisions 
have raised significant questions as to how in future any party dealing with a 
governmental entity could sensibly agree to refer any dispute arising out of those 
dealings to arbitration in the knowledge that the public entity will have almost 
unfettered right to disclose any information that might arise during the course of 
the arbitration, no matter how commercially sensitive it may be, simply by labeling 
it as a matter of “public interest.”78 
Anyway, the “balancing approach” proposed by Patrick Neil QC appreciates 
that these conflicting demands will have to be carefully weighed79 where “the 
court would uphold the public interest in the dissemination of information which 
ought to be before the public… but the court would nevertheless remain alert to use 
its authority… to check any threatened abuse of the right to [disclose or] 
                                                 
74 Commonwealth of Australia v. Cockatoo Dockyard Pty Limited (No. 2), supra note 69, per 
President of the New South Wales Court of Appeal, Mr. Justice Kirby at 675. 
75 Id., at 682. 
76  Neill, Confidentiality in Arbitration, supra note 35 at 311.  The natural desire of a 
commercial entity may be expressed by its specifically contracting for dispute resolution through 
arbitration to restrict the dissemination of the substance of the procedure. See id. 
77 Per Justice Brennan in the Esso/BHP v. Plowman, supra note 22, at 37. 
78 “[I]n the two Australian cases under review the High Court and the New South Wales Court 
of Appeal ‘elected not to enquire into the real motivations underlying the decision in each case of a 
public entity participant to seek to make disclosure’ and they fear lest the threat of publication could 
be used for tactical purposes in connection with the arbitration itself.” Citing Rogers & Miller: 
Non-Confidential Arbitration Proceedings, 12 ARB. INT’L 319, 327  (1996). 
79 Neil, Confidentiality in Arbitration, supra note 35 at 313. 
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publish.”80  In a major investment dispute between a State and a foreign investor, 
an example of such a cautious approach is found in the Amco Asia Corp. v. 
Republic of Indonesia ICSID arbitration, where the arbitrators were not prepared to 
recognize an explicit duty to maintain confidentiality but only an implied duty not 
to exacerbate a dispute.81 
 
3. Private Interests 
With regard to “private interests,” English courts have been fairly active in 
developing guidelines, where their judges have long maintained the view that this 
right to disclose should be carefully constrained and that, while the guiding 
presumption favors confidentiality, it is not absolute and should be moderated by a 
recognition that there will clearly arise commercial or other circumstances which 
may prevail over all other interests and warrant release. Convincing reasons are 
required to justify the tribunal’s discretion. The tests have been laid down 
through a line of case precedents in the past decade.  
 
a. Hassneh Insurance and Insurance Co.v. Lloyd’s Syndicate: “Business 
Efficacy” 
“In Hassneh Insurance,82 Mr. Justice Coleman applied a so-called “business 
efficacy” test, which asks whether the breach of confidentiality is reasonably 
necessary for the establishment or protection of an arbitrating party’s legal rights 
vis-à-vis a third party.” 83 In the Insurance Co. case,84 he further inquired whether 
disclosure of the award “[m]ust be ‘strongly persuasive’ of that party’s particular 
legal rights, or need that party go further and show that it is an ‘essential element in 
the formulation’ of the related action.”85 Mr. Justice Coleman “argued that the 
disclosure… merely for the reason that it may have a persuasive effect in a related 
dispute would not be sufficient grounds for ousting the undertaking.”86 
He stated, 
 
                                                 
80 “And the court would thus to the extent necessary in the circumstances allow the obligation of 
confidence to be overridden.” Id.  
81 Procedural Decision of 9 December 1983, 24 ILM 365 (1985). Similar to the Esso/BHP, for a 
major investment dispute between a State and a foreign investor, it is highly unlikely that the 
elements of the dispute were confidential in nature or that aspects of it had not been the subject of 
public discussion and controversy. 
82 Hassneh Insurance Co. of Israel v. Stuart J. Mew, supra note 20. 
83 Per Mr. Justice Coleman, Id. at 249.  
84 Insurance Co. v. Lloyd’s Syndicate, [1995] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 272. 
85 Rogers & Miller, supra note 78 at 325, quoting Insurance Co. v. Lloyd’s Syndicate. 
86 Id. (emphasis in original). 
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 … for the purpose of coming within the qualification to the duty of confidence 
which attaches to an arbitration award, it is sufficiently necessary to disclose an 
arbitration award … only if the right in question cannot be enforced or protected 
unless the award and reasons are disclosed to a stranger to the arbitration 
agreement. The making of the award must therefore be a necessary element in the 
establishment of the party’s legal rights against the stranger. This is the furthest 
boundary to the qualification which business efficacy will permit.87 
 
b. Ali Shipping v. Shipyard Trogir: “Reasonable Necessity” 
In Ali Shipping, Potter LJ expanded upon what constitutes “a necessary 
element.” He held that the court should take a broad approach in requiring a party 
seeking disclosure to prove necessity.88 Potter LJ held that the court should take 
account of: 
 
… the nature and purposes of the proceedings for which the material is required, 
the powers and procedures of the tribunal in which the proceedings are being 
conducted, the issues to which the evidence or information sought is being 
directed and the practicality and expense of obtaining such evidence or 
information elsewhere.89 
 
The Court of Appeal found that there was, as matter of law, a duty of 
confidentiality between the parties to an arbitration. In deciding whether to 
override that duty, the appropriate test was whether disclosure was reasonably 
necessary either for disposing fairly of the action or for saving costs.90  
 
c. Associated Electric: “essential purpose of arbitration” 
Later, in Associated Electric, 91  regarding the extent of confidentiality 
applicable to an award, the English judicial approach stepped down a little bit with 
an even more delicate attitude — by placing emphasis on the essential purpose of 
arbitration. This test certainly reminds us of the similar approach taken in Hyundai 
Engineering 92  ten years ago, where the disclosing party was required to 
                                                 
87 Insurance Co. v. Lloyd’s Syndicate at 276. Indeed, it should at least readily be assumed that 
confidentiality can be forfeited to effect important social considerations that underlie the doctrine of 
res judicata – to avoid inconsistent determinations and to forestall repetitive litigations. 
88 Ali Shipping Corporation v. Shipyard Trogir, supra note 21 at 147. 
89 Id. at 148. 
90 See conclusion by ANDREW TWEEDDALE & KAREN TWEEDDALE. A PRACTICAL APPROACH TO 
ARBITRATION LAW, 259 (1999). 
91  Associated Electric & Gas Insurance Services Limited v. The European Reinsurance 
Company of Zurich,  [hereinafter Associated Electric], supra note 47. 
92 Hyundai Engineering v. Active Building & Civil Construction (Pte) limted (in liquidation), 
(unreported) 9 March 1994, Phillips J. See discussion in Editorial, 11 ARB. INT’L 231, 232 (1995).  
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demonstrate at the outset that, the disclosure is for a proper purpose or, the “fair 
disposal of the action.”93 
The Privy Council in Associated Electric noted that the desirability and merit 
of this approach were required “to be evaluated having regard to the surrounding 
circumstances in which this confidentiality agreement was made and the basic 
principles and purpose of arbitration.” 94  The court went on to construe the 
confidentiality agreement so as to give effect to the fundamental purpose of 
arbitration, namely to determine disputes between parties. 
Over the past decade, the ambit of the obligation of confidentiality has not yet 
been clarified while the English judicial attitude lacks objective certainty. 
Practically speaking, a case-by-case approach is best with specific reference first 
being made to the subject documents or information in order to determine their 
relevance or whether they are to be used for a legitimate purpose. 
In sum, to protect other competing public and private interests, the rule of law 
needs to define, and where necessary and appropriate, to declare the limits beyond 
which the purported powers in pursuit of private arbitration intrude into and 
compete with other legitimate public and private rights and duties. 
 
IV. PROBLEMATIC SITUATIONS 
 
A. Arbitration Confidentiality v. Business Transparency 
 
1. Disclosure in Due Diligence Process 
By way of example, the due diligence process will be examined as a case study. 
The hypothetical situation is that, in the course of an arbitration between the 
Claimant A and the Respondent B, A applied to the tribunal for disclosure of the 
existence of the arbitration proceeding to C,95 as required by the court decision in 
country A that “the party under due diligence must divulge the existence of any 
claim to the prospective purchaser.” A is now facing two conflicting obligations, 
                                                 
93 Rogers & Miller, Non-Confidential Arbitration Proceedings, supra note 78 at 326. The 
Hyundai Engineering case also foreshadows the possibility of the English courts moving away from 
the strict implied term basis of the confidentiality undertaking to a more flexible regime that may 
condone disclosure in certain situations when criteria are satisfied. 
94 Associated Electric, supra note 47, per Lord Hobhouse of Woodborough at 1045, para. 7. 
95 Company A is undergoing a take-over by Company C. Is A obligated to refrain from 
divulging the existence of the arbitration and all details in connection with it in due diligence 
currently being conducted by C? The hypothetical situation was actually one of the issues in the 11th 
Annual Williem C Vis International Commercial Arbitration Moot Competition problem (April 2 to 8, 
2004, Vienna), where A relies on Article 34 of the SIAC Rules (Singapore International Arbitration 
Center) as the legal basis. The Problem is available at http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/ 
cisg/moot/moot11.pdf. 
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the duty of confidentiality owed to B under the arbitration agreement and the duty 
of disclosure owed to C under the court decisions.   
In this regard, there is a clear policy and public interest preference in which the 
obligation of disclosure in the due diligence trumps the obligation of 
confidentiality in the arbitration. The reasoning is derived from the legislative goal 
of a better corporate governance through the due diligence process, which provides 
a prospective purchaser of a company with a right to know what it will get when it 
buys a company. This increases the transparency, and reduces the risk and 
uncertainty of the transaction.96 Were the due diligence obligations of disclosure to 
be overridden by the duties of confidentiality in arbitration, business transactions 
would be made less transparent and the global market economy would be 
negatively affected.97 
A similar analogy to this required disclosure of the tri-party relationship 
growing out of the due diligence process is the duty to report involving the 
“Customer (Company) – Bank – Auditor/SFC”98 in the corporate governance 
sector, where the bank owes a duty of confidentiality to the customer and 
simultaneously has a duty to disclose to the auditor/SFC.99 To a certain extent, 
confidentiality must be sacrificed to maintain financial integrity.  
Under circumstances where a law or regulation requires the disclosure of 
certain documents on the grounds of national economy or financial integrity, 
arbitrators sitting in a country other than that which issued the regulation in 
question are generally under no obligation to give effect to it. At the most, they 
may take such regulations into consideration in deciding what constitutes a 
legitimate reason for disclosure. Arbitrators sitting in the country which enacted 
such a regulation might have a more difficult task, as their award will be subject to 
an action to set aside or to refuse enforcement in that country and the rule in 
question may be held to be a requirement of public policy.100  
Gaillard and Savage suggest that  
                                                 
96  Moreover, due diligence improves the efficiency of the decision-making process and 
encourages parties to invest, thereby increasing the efficiency and improving the health of a market 
economy. See MICHAEL WHALLEY & THOMAS HEYMANN, INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS ACQUISITIONS: 
MAJOR LEGAL ISSUES AND DUE DILIGENCE, (2000). See also, WINFRIED F. SCHMITZ, DUE DILIGENCE 
FOR CORPORATE ACQUISITIONS, (1996); W.D. DUNCAN & SAMANTHA J. TRAVES: DUE DILIGENCE, 
(1995). 
97 CRAIG, PARK AND PAULSSON, supra note 26 at 313-314. 
98 SFC is short for the Securities and Futures Commission. 
99 For instance, the SFC in Hong Kong mandates that, under the acquisition procedure, the 
banker shall report the company’s balance sheets to the prospective purchaser. See SAY GOO & ANNE 
CARVER, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: THE HONG KONG DEBATE, (2003) Chapter 6, with the subtitle 
“Whistle-blowing and the immunity of the auditor – problem of confidentiality and public interest.” 
100 The enforcing state can refuse recognition and enforcement by virtue of Article V(1)(e) of 
the New York Convention on grounds of “violation of the public policy of the enforcing state.” 
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Where a party seeks to rely on the confidentiality of certain documents so as to 
defeat the other party’s request for compulsory disclosure, . . . one solution may be 
for a party disclosing confidential documents to do so on condition that the 
opposing party or parties . . .that receive copies of the documents sign a 
confidential agreement. The aim of such an agreement is to oblige each signatory 
to limit the use of the disclosed documents to purposes strictly related to the 
arbitration, if need be, to limit the number of individuals who will have access to 
the documents and to return all original documents or copies after the 
arbitration.101 
 
B. Disclosure by Publicly Listed Companies 
 
Listed companies are subject to disclosure obligations which arise from a 
combination of rules and regulations enshrined in legislation or issued by 
regulatory authorities, as well as guidelines issued by such regulatory authorities as 
to the interpretation of such binding obligations.  
Companies whose shares are traded on a regulated market are required to 
publish their annual company and consolidated accounts,102 where facts which are 
likely to have a material impact on the company’s accounts must be clearly set out.  
“In this regard, various publicly listed companies make express disclosures in their 
annual reports concerning current litigation, including, where relevant, a fairly 
detailed description of its pending disputes.”103 Arbitrators working with ICSID 
have reportedly acknowledged that because of duties imposed by domestic laws, a 
company could find itself “under a positive duty to provide certain information 
about its activities to its shareholders, especially regarding its involvement in a 
process the outcome of which could perhaps significantly affect its share value.”104  
The underlying policy considerations are obvious. The disclosure to the public 
of timely reliable and complete information is a prerequisite to a company’s 
participation in financial markets. Such disclosure required by regulatory 
                                                 
101 FOUCHARD GAILLARD GOLDMAN ON INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 1265, para. 
693 (Emmanuel Gaillard & John Savage eds. 1999).  For an example of a confidentiality order 
adopted by consent, see the July 12, 1994 Order in ICC Case No. 7893, 125 J.D.I. 1069(1998), and 
observations by Dominique Hascher, cited in Gaillard & Savage, supra.   
102  The listed company must also publish a document addressed to the relevant market 
regulatory body, which contains all information (not only economic but also legal). In EU Member 
States, this obligation arises in particular from Directive 8/390/CE and legislation pursuant thereto.  
103 Valery Denoix de Saint Marc: Confidentiality of Arbitration and the Obligations to Disclose 
Information on Listed Companies or During Due Diligence Investigations, 20(2) J. INT’L ARB. 214 
(2003). 
104 Margrete Stevens: Confidentiality Revisited, 17(1) News From ICSID 2 (2000), available at 
http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/news/n-17-1-2.htm. 
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provisions as well as guidelines are intended to guarantee the transparency of the 
market, and again, to ensure the financial integrity as a whole.  
The problem might arise, however, as to how to define the clear boundary of 
“materiality.” If the ongoing disputes will not be likely to result in a material effect 
upon the company’s accounts, can the confidentiality survive? So far, there has 
been no universal legal test on what constitutes “materiality,” with some scholars 
having suggested a combined approach of “objectivity and subjectivity,” taking 
into account not only the actual amount of the ongoing dispute, but the likelihood 
of success, in the balancing of interests.105 In any event, if such reference in the 
annual report is merely limited to indicating the existence of an arbitration 
proceeding, it will not constitute a breach of confidentiality. On the other hand, 
parties should not be allowed to disclose the details of the proceedings.106 
In conclusion, factors militating in favor of disclosure should be weighed 
against the desirability of preserving the confidentiality of the original arbitration 
and its subject matter. When weighing these factors to justify “compulsory 
disclosure,” an arbitrator should take into account the primary “interests of the 
parties” in the matter before him, but not withhold publication “out of a generalized 
concern . . . that publication would upset the confidence of the business 
community” in international commercial arbitration. If the tribunal withholds 
disclosure “where a party before it would suffer some real prejudice . . . or where 
publication” would divulge sensitive matters, parties could rest assured that their 
“confidentiality in arbitration will, where appropriate, be preserved.” 107 
 
V. DESIRABILITY OF CONFIDENTIALITY 
 
A. Valued Attribute in Arbitration 
 
If it is true that confidentiality is always a highly valued attribute of arbitration, 
then we need to explore the underlying policy considerations. However, if the 
value of confidentiality varies depending on the context, then it may be possible to 
make arbitration somewhat more transparent in some contexts without 
                                                 
105 In the 11th Annual of Williem C Vis International Commercial Arbitration Moot Competition 
problem, supra note 95, some teams raised this point, which was shared by Prof. Lu Song from the 
China Foreign Affairs Institute and Prof. Katherine Lynch from the University of Hong Kong.  
106 Such details which would violate the duty of confidentiality may involve: name of the parties, 
amount of the dispute, why parties rush into conflicts. 
107 Department of Economic Policy and Development of the City of Moscow v. Bankers Trust 
Co., [2004] EWCA Civ. 314, [2004] 2 All ER (Comm.) 193, para.41. A brief introduction is available 
in [2004] INT’L A.L.R.: News Section, N-48. 
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undermining the other aspects of arbitration that make it valuable to the 
participants.108 
Confidentiality in arbitration may be valuable for a variety of reasons. To 
begin with, parties to the arbitration may not wish to expose certain allegations to 
the public.109 In addition, parties choosing arbitration may not want a “loss” 
publicized, especially if the party is involved in other cases with similar claims and 
defenses. 110  Moreover, parties to an arbitration may want to take positions 
privately, particularly in the sense that confidentiality protects sensitive business 
information or trade secrets. All of these reasons demonstrate that there is a real 
value to maintaining a certain degree of confidentiality in arbitration, at least in 
some cases. 
Quite practical concerns may follow that, if confidentiality should be abolished 
in international arbitration in a particular jurisdiction, there might be a flight by the 
arbitration community. At least since Esso/BHP, there have been significant 
concerns with regard to Australia’s standing as a preferred venue for international 
arbitration, especially in the case of a deal with a government entity as the 
procedural counterpart.111  
The paradox is that, while they may complain about the legal vacuum 
regarding confidentiality in international arbitration practice, parties may find it 
undesirable for the rules to be too comprehensive. On the other hand, although 
confidentiality in arbitration is seen as a positive factor, some “side effects” have 
been raised in arguments by legal practitioners.112 As confidentiality prevents the 
dissemination of details of reasons and rulings, it may have a negative impact on 
the development of standardization of commercial practices. Without such 
precedents or legal principles in place, and without the certainty and consistency 
they bring,113 legal counsel may find it difficult to advise their clients properly.114 
                                                 
108 A recent study suggests that, in fact, privacy or confidentiality is not one of the most valued 
aspects of international commercial arbitration. See Richard W. Naimark & Stephanie E. Keer, What 
Do Parties Really Want From International Commercial Arbitration?, AAA DISPUTE RESOLUTION J. 
78 (Nov. 2002/Jan. 2003). 
109 These all may involve allegations of bad faith, misrepresentation, incompetence, lack of 
liquidity. See supra note 2. 
110 Although arbitral awards have no precedential effect, publication of the award may inspire 
further litigation or result in significant commercial prejudice, notwithstanding the fact that at the 
enforcement stage the award may be made public. See Paulsson & Rawding: The Trouble with 
Confidentiality, supra note 37 at 306. 
111 For details, see Expert Reports and Case Notes discussing the Esso case in 11(3) ARB. INT’L 
(1995). 
112 The issue was under considerable discussion in the recent Inter-Pacific Bar Association 
Conference in Seoul, Korea. Some of the points have been concluded in the paper by Christopher To: 
The Myth about the Duty of Confidentiality in Arbitration, HONG KONG LAWYER (Nov. 2005). 
113 Dr. Julian D.M. Lew supported this argument that “the lack of uniformity and, in many 
instances, the lack of insistence on confidentiality in the practice of international commercial 
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B. Transparency 
 
The argument for making international commercial arbitration more 
transparent may be somewhat compelling in that “greater transparency would 
likely increase knowledge and understanding of the arbitral process, thereby 
increasing the legitimacy of the use of international arbitration more generally. In 
particular, increasing transparency in international arbitration . . . would likely 
result in . . . the following benefits.”115 
First, publication of reasoned awards would bring about the development of 
consistency in the law of arbitration. 116  While arbitral awards do not have 
precedential effect, they “do have persuasive value and ‘can coalesce into 
collective arbitral wisdom’ that may be drawn upon by future parties and 
arbitrators.” 117  As a general rule, “when the process has consistency and 
predictability, its legitimacy is enhanced because parties know what to expect.”118 
Business persons dislike uncertainty. “Thus, even in arbitration, parties are likely 
to value certainty and predictability.”119 Second, “greater transparency promotes 
democratic principles because the affected public, such as the shareholders of a 
publicly held corporation and consumers, has an opportunity to observe and 
evaluate the outcome.” Last but not the least, increasingly transparent arbitration 
may provide an “opportunity for practitioners and academics to understand, 
                                                                                                                           
arbitration, suggest that, “[u]nless parties are in agreement, there can be no confidentiality in the 
conduct of the arbitration.” Quoted in  Patrick Neil: Confidentiality in Arbitration, supra note 35, at 
302-03. 
114 It really boils down to the practical experience and exposure of a particular legal counsel and 
his ability to negotiate and draft suitable provisions to ensure that the arbitration process maintains the 
essence of confidentiality. 
115 Cindy Buys, supra note 29 at 135. 
116 GAILLARD & SAVAGE, supra note 101, para. 1412. 
117 See Richard C. Reuben, Constitutional Gravity: A Unity Theory of Alternative Dispute 
Resolution and Public Civil Justice, 47 UCLA L. REV. 949, 1085 (APRIL 2000). 
118 Cindy Buys, supra note 29 at 136.  Parties “have a greater understanding of the process, 
leading to greater satisfaction with it, and are therefore more likely to use it again.” See id., citing 
Andrea K. Schneider: Democracy and Dispute resolution: Individual Rights in International Trade 
Organizations, 19 U.PA. J. INT’L.ECON.L. 587, 614 (1998).  See also Richard C. Reuben, 
Constitutional Gravity: A Unity Theory of Alternative Dispute Resolution and Public Civil Justice, 47 
U.C.L.A. L. REV. 949, 1085 (Apr. 2000). 
119 Cindy Buys, supra note 29 at 136. “Consistency is particularly valuable when there are a 
series of disputes among different parties arising out of the same transaction.” Id. at 136 n. 61. See 
also Delissa A. Ridgway: Int’l Arbitration: The Next Growth Industry, 54-Feb. DISP. RESOL. .J. 50,52 
(1999);  
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analyze, critique and improve the efficacy of the dispute resolution system at 
issue.”120 
As Professor Buys notes, “There are, of course, costs to making arbitration 
more transparent. . . . [I]t is true that if arbitration is made more transparent, parties 
will not be able to so easily hide damaging allegations.”121  This potentially 
negative consequence should be weighed against the greater efficiency and 
democracy achieved” by allowing the public to observe and hold the parties 
accountable for their actions, especially where large publicly held corporations or 
government parties are involved.”122 In addition, for commercial worries that 
transparency could lead to exposure of business confidences or trade secrets, 
parties could designate such information in a detailed confidentiality agreement “at 
the very outset of arbitration and any references to that information could be 
redacted from the final award prior to publication.  . . . [Therefore], it would seem 
that such sensitive information could still be fairly easily protected without making 
the entire proceeding and/or result confidential.”123  
What needs to be noted is that “party autonomy is one of the hallmarks of 
arbitration” and choices made by the parties ought to be respected in full by 
arbitrators, tribunals, arbitral institutions as well as courts. “If the parties contract 
for a certain degree of confidentiality and that choice is not respected, arbitration 
will become less desirable. . . . To the extent that arbitration loses its confidential 
nature, it loses one of its distinctive features and becomes more like litigation.”124 
Finally, “a more transparent process could result in an unwillingness of parties to 
admit certain facts or take certain positions because of fear of public reaction. All 
of these potential costs must be weighed in any determination of where to draw the 
line between confidentiality and transparency in arbitration.”125 
In sum, “a more nuanced approach to confidentiality in arbitration and 
allowing a greater degree of transparency where appropriate” could be achieved 
through “a careful weighing of the . . . costs of confidentiality versus greater 
transparency under the facts of the particular situation.” In most cases, it is more 
likely than not that “such a balancing will at least result in a decision to publish the 
                                                 
120 Cindy Buys, supra note 29 at 136-37. The maritime arbitration societies, partly for the 
aforementioned reasons, reverse the traditional presumption and make the arbitral awards publishable 
unless the parties object. 
121  Id. at 137.  Such concerns of loss of confidentiality can be alleviated by publishing 
“sanitized” arbitral awards. See discussion supra, Sec. III (A)(2).  
122 Id. 
123 Id. at 137 and n. 67.  
124 Id. at 138. Confidentiality is one of the primary facets of arbitration that distinguishes it from 
judicial litigation. See discussion supra. 
125 Id.    
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[“sanitized” arbitral] awards to the benefit of the international arbitration 
community as a whole.126 
 
VI. CONCLUSION 
 
A. Consequences of Breach of Confidentiality 
 
If confidentiality is imposed and the arbitrating party still discloses the 
proprietary information, an injunction may be called for. However, arbitrators 
should be reluctant to direct injunctive relief when the person making the 
disclosure has a legitimate reason for making it. In that case, damages, if properly 
ascertainable, may be the only appropriate remedy. Although the person making 
disclosure has a legitimate interest in making it, yet such disclosure does some 
harm to the other party. In determining whether injunctive relief is proper, 
arbitrators should apply their own standards, but grant due deference to the policies 
of the place where the disclosure was, or is likely to be made. 
If the disclosure was improper and a legitimate interest of the party 
complaining of the disclosure had been injured, exemplary damages should be 
assessed. However, the avoidance of the arbitration agreement (arbitration clause) 
per se, 127 should rarely be invoked. If ever allowed, such sanctions may flow from 
those extreme cases of a most outrageous breach of confidentiality that does 
substantial harm to the opponent. Of course, it may be rather difficult to prove such 
an egregious breach. The author here proposes to borrow the terminology of 
“fundamental breach” from the CISG to refer to such substantial harm. 128 To 
justify the “fundamental breach,” the complaining party must prove that the 
disclosure has caused a “fundamental change of circumstances” and has rendered 
his position greatly deteriorated or radically different from what he had originally 
anticipated. 
For arbitrators, “non-compliance with the requirement of secrecy could render 
the arbitrator in breach personally liable, but would not invalidate the award.”129  
                                                 
126 Id. The benefits may help to reach certainty, consistency, educational or academic purposes 
in arbitration practice and literature. 
127 Similar to the avoidance of a common commercial contract or a contractual clause. See 
United Nations Convention on Contracts for International Sales of Goods (CISG), available at 
http://www.uncitral.org/english/texts/sales/CISG.htm. 
128 For a detailed analysis of “fundamental breach” of the CISG, see SCHMITTHOFF’S EXPORT 
TRADE: THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE 84-123 (10th ed. 2000); see also Clive 
Schmitthoff, International Business Law: The New Merchant, in SCHMITTHOFF’S SELECT ESSAYS ON 
INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW (Chia – Jui Cheng ed. 1989). 
129 Gaillard & Savage, Fouchard Gaillard Goldman On International Commercial Arbitration, 
supra note 101, at para. 1374. 
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With regard to the enforcement of the tribunal’s order of confidentiality, 
should the disclosing party fail to comply, the arbitrators should be entitled to draw 
a negative inference upon the final arbitral award.130 Even if the arbitrators would 
not ordinarily have the means of enforcing compliance with such an order, such an 
order might be capable of judicial enforcement in certain jurisdictions or otherwise 
serve as the basis of a claim for damages, if breached.131 
 
B. Suggestions 
 
As we have seen, most national laws and institutional rules have not addressed 
the issue of confidentiality at all or lack objective certainty in its practical 
application. Since a general rule of confidentiality is favored by most jurisdictions, 
an in-between approach should be adopted to harmonize the two extreme 
attitudes.132 Where either the confidentiality is ordered blindly as flowing from the 
private nature of the procedure, or it is rejected on the theory that no general 
obligation of confidentiality exists de lege lata in international arbitration at all, 
there is still an argument that the obligation of confidentiality in international 
arbitration is implied by trade and usage. To achieve the objective, arbitration laws 
and rules, including those of UNCITRAL and the ICC, should be drafted so as to 
create an explicit positive duty on the part of the participants in arbitrations, as well 
as to clearly distinguish the duty of confidentiality from its synonymous term 
privacy. At the same time, it seems necessary that such a general rule must be 
tempered by qualified exceptions, for practical, commercial and legal reasons, 
where the proper threshold would be used upon a study of “checks and balances on 
interests” to decide if the disclosure were justified.  
What shall also be borne in mind is the fact that just as is the case with an order 
for security for costs,133 the duty of confidentiality may also become a two-edged 
sword. On one hand, the result of an absolute right to confidentiality may be that a 
party to an arbitration does not receive justice; on the other hand, the unfettered or 
loosely restrained right of disclosure may lead to the “public/private interests” 
being misused. As a result, the tribunal should strike an extremely cautious balance 
                                                 
130 IBA RULES OF EVIDENCE IN INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION, Art. 9. 
131 YVES DERAINS & ERIC A. SCHWARTZ: A Guide to the New ICC Rules of Arbitration 256 
(1998). 
132 See Sec. (I)(C) supra.    
133 The security for costs, as an abnormal interim measure of protection, on one hand, may fall 
into the trap as being used as an oppressive weapon to stifle the claimant’s meritorious claim. 
Conversely, if security for costs were not posted, the respondent might bear the potential risk of being 
misused by an impecunious claimant to obstruct the procedure. For detailed policy considerations, see 
Noah Rubins, In God We Trust, All Others Pay Cash: Security for Costs in International Commercial 
Arbitration, 11 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 307 (2000).  
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of interests between the parties by taking into account all the relevant factors under 
the circumstances surrounding the claim. 
Although there is no uniform answer in either national laws or institutional 
rules as to the exact extent and scope to which the participants in an arbitration are 
under the duty to observe the confidentiality of information relating to the case, the 
impact of the Esso/BHP, 134  Panhandle Eastern 135  and Bulgarian Bank 136 
decisions should not in themselves be overstated. From a global perspective, this is 
really a complex issue where the two schools represented by England and Australia 
have much to learn from each other. Actually, in the Associated Electric v. 
Reinsurance case,137 we have seen a change in the English attitude, where more 
convergence can be detected: 
 
Their Lordships’ reservations concerning the characterization of the duty of 
confidentiality as an implied term challenges the accepted norm and suggests that 
their Lordships wish the English law obligations of privacy and confidentiality in 
arbitration to be defined more precisely.138 
 
In practice, there are possibly two workable solutions for the issue of 
confidentiality: (1) from a macro point of view, in legislation, arbitration 
institutions and national laws could introduce much clearer and wider ranging rules 
on the subject of confidentiality; and (2) from the micro viewpoint, in the 
contracting stage, when parties themselves can exercise more control, parties 
should provide for more detailed references to confidentiality in their agreement. 
With regard to legislation, as we may see, the legislatures of some countries 
have implemented or may implement shortly supportive statutory provisions on the 
issue of confidentiality. 139  Furthermore, various arbitration institutions have 
revisited their rules so as to cater more specifically to the duty of confidentiality in 
                                                 
134 Esso Australia Resources Ltd. v. Plowman, supra note 22. 
135 United States v. Panhandle Eastern Corporation, supra note 23.  
136 Bulgarian Foreign Trade Bank Limited v. A.I. Trade Finance Inc., supra note 24. 
137 Associated Electric & Gas Insurance Services Ltd v. European Reinsurance Co. of Zurich, 
supra note 47. 
138 Audley Sheppard, Case Comment on Associated Electric & Gas Insurance Services Ltd v. 
European Reinsurance Co. of Zurich, 6(3) INT’L A.L.R. N25-27 (2003). 
139 This may also suggest the possible legislative trend for the issue of arbitration confidentiality. 
For example, the New Zealand Arbitration Act 1996, Section 14(1) entitled “Disclosure of 
information relating to arbitral proceedings and awards prohibited”; Norway Draft Arbitration Act, 
“Duty of confidentiality and public access to arbitration.” It is not inconceivable that other 
legislatures will follow suit. England’s Departmental Advisory Committee on Arbitration Law’s 
Report of the Arbitration Bill of February 1996 has commented that, “in due course, if the whole 
matter [of the exceptions to confidentiality] were ever to become judicially resolved, it would remain 
possible to add a statutory provision by way of amendment to the Bill.” 
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arbitration proceedings, albeit to varying degrees.140 However, there hard work is 
still needed to achieve a Uniform Default Rule of Confidentiality in international 
commercial arbitration in order to foster stability and predictability, which are 
considered two paramount requirements by most participants in international 
transactions.141 
Certainly, the approach of some tribunals in recent years suggests that, 
prevention is still the best and foremost approach.142 Such unsettled issues as the 
exact extent to which confidentiality attaches to the different elements or stages of 
an arbitration continue to lend support to the warning that parties should not 
assume that confidentiality attaches to materials produced or information disclosed 
in arbitration proceedings merely because the proceedings are conducted in 
“private.” The insertion of a contractual clause clearly setting out the parties’ duty 
of confidentiality in arbitration should be considered carefully. 143 In drafting the 
appropriate confidentiality provisions, parties might agree on the types of 
information to be treated as confidential. They might also include the remedies 
available upon breach of the confidentiality undertaking 144  as well as any 
circumstances in which confidential information may be disclosed.  
To conclude, every practitioner and user of arbitration services should be 
concerned about the issue of confidentiality in arbitration proceedings. It is 
important to address this matter carefully in order to gain worldwide acceptance 
and to build confidence in arbitration as an effective means of international dispute 
resolution.  
 
                                                 
140 For instance, the London Court of International Arbitration (LCIA) revised its rules in 1998, 
providing far more extensively for confidentiality. The LCIA Rules 1998 include in Article 30, 
“Unless the parties expressly agree in writing to the contrary, the parties undertake as a general 
principle to keep confidential . . . save and to the extent that disclosure may be required of a party by 
legal duty, to protect or pursue a legal right or to enforce or challenge an award ….” (emphasis 
added).   
141 PETER BINDER, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION IN UNCITRAL MODEL LAW 
JURISDICTIONS 233, Chap. 9/Para. 9-018 (2002). See also, Jeffrey W. Sarles, Solving the Arbitral 
Confidentiality Conundrum in International Arbitration, in ADR AND THE LAW 428-39 (18th ed. 
2002). 
142  Preventive measures by parties are critical, as institutional recommended “generic” 
arbitration clauses rarely mention the issue of confidentiality. 
143 Notwithstanding the fact that it is generally unusual for parties to focus in so great detail at 
the contracting stage on issues of confidentiality that may arise in a possible dispute in the distant 
future. Furthermore, the parties in an arbitration might not have the same understanding as regards the 
extent of confidentiality as is expected. 
144 Useful suggestions and recommendations can be found in Paulsson & Rawding, The Trouble 
with Confidentiality, supra note 37; see also Leon E. Trakman, Confidentiality in International 
Commercial Arbitration, 18 ARB. INT’L 1 (2002). 
